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T. S. Cont. No.
AFCIN, HQ USAF

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Attachment to TS 141829

22 August 1958

OPERATIONAL SOVIET NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
IN MID-1962

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the numbers of offensive nuclear delivery vehicles of various types (ground-launched guided missiles of 700 n.m. or greater maximum range,* air-to-surface guided missiles, medium and heavy bombers and tankers, naval and tactical bombers, submarine-launched guided missiles and guided missile submarines) the USSR will have in operational use in mid-1962; these estimates to be prepared for the purpose of providing a contribution to the intelligence assumptions used by the Net Evaluation Sub-committee.

* Ground-launched guided missiles of less than 700 n.m. maximum range, some of which would be equipped with nuclear warheads, were excluded upon consultation with NESC Staff representative.

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BROAD ASSUMPTIONS

For purposes of this study, it is assumed:

-- that there will be no international agreement on the limitation or control of armaments during this period;

-- that the USSR is not and will not during the period of this estimate be preparing for general war to begin at any particular date in the future (i.e. that the date 1962 has no special significance in Soviet planning);

-- that Soviet military thinking and strategy will be generally as outlined in NIE 11-4-57;

-- that Soviet requirements for offensive nuclear delivery systems will in general be related to the missions to be performed and targets to be attacked in the event of general war, and also to the strength and composition of those Soviet military components which logically would employ the various delivery systems;

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-- that Soviet programs for production and operational deployment of offensive nuclear delivery systems during this period will be affected by considerations of optimum effectiveness vs. cost of weapon systems, maximum utilization of proven military hardware, minimum loss or wastage due to obsolescence factors, and maximum efficiency in the utilization of available resources.

PROPOSED NUMBERS OF DELIVERY VEHICLES IN SOVIET
OPERATIONAL UNITS, MID-1962

HEAVY BOMBERS/TANKERS

Number: 200-300

Estimated composition by type: See SNIE 11-7-58

ICBMs

Number: 500-800

Estimated characteristics: See NIE 11-5-58

Assumed characteristics:

- (a) Salvo capability 50 percent
- (b) Deployment concept 50 percent rail-mobile, 50 percent static
- (c) Static sites hardened to withstand average of 25-50 psi.

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MEDIUM BOMBERS/TANKERS

Piston: None

Jet: 1350 (Per AFCIN contribution to NIE 11-4-58)

Estimated characteristics: See SEC contribution to NIE 11-4-58

Assumed composition by role:

- (a) Long Range Aviation: (To be supplied)
- (b) Naval Aviation: (To be supplied)
- (c) Tactical Aviation: (To be supplied)

Assumed composition by type: (To be supplied)

GUIDED MISSILE SUBMARINES

Converted topside stowage, cruise-type: 20
Assumed missile capacity: 2 each

New, internal stowage, cruise-type: 20
Assumed missile capacity: 4 each

New, internal stowage, ballistic: 1 or 2
Assumed missile capacity: 4-8 each

Estimated characteristics of missiles:
See NIE 11-5-58

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GROUND-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (700 and 1,100 n.m. maximum range)

Number: 500-700, of which half of each range.

Estimated characteristics: See NIE 11-5-58

Assumed characteristics:

- (a) Salvo capability 20-25 percent
- (b) Deployment concept mobile, road and rail

*Not
estimated*

JET LIGHT BOMBERS

Number: 2350 (Per AFCIN contribution, 11-4-58)

Estimated characteristics: See SEC contribution to NIE 11-4-58

Assumed composition by role:

- (a) Tactical Aviation: (To be supplied)
- (b) Naval Aviation: (To be supplied)

Assumed composition by type: (To be supplied)

AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

AS-1 (55 n.m.): 300

AS-2 (100 n.m.): 200

Estimated characteristics: See NIE 11-5-58

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